Dissertation Project:
My dissertation examines the conditions for the effective judicial prosecution of complex criminal phenomena, particularly systemic political corruption. As the recent examples of corruption investigations at the highest level of political power in Brazil, France, South Korea, Pakistan, and Israel show, the effective prosecution of this crime holds relevance not only for developing countries with relatively weak institutions, but also for well-established democracies. I show that judicial actors can increase their knowledge of complex criminal issues through their relationship with groups of social activists mobilized against pervasive illegality. Thus, my dissertation focuses on the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge through networks of judicial actors and social activists. I also show that different institutional frameworks affect the likelihood of network formation. To this end, I offer an original classification of judiciary branches’ internal organizations as either flat or elitist to different degrees. I show that flat judicial institutions more easily allow their members to create informal networks with their peers and with societal actors. Moreover, within flat institutions, those jurisdictions where case assignment follows meritocratic or egalitarian criteria will encourage younger judges’ specialization in the effective prosecution of crime. As a result, these jurisdictions will witness the accumulation of legal expertise over time on specific criminal issues.
I use qualitative analytic techniques such as process tracing and case studies to assess my theory. My analysis focuses on the Italian judiciary over the years from re-democratization, in 1945, until 1996. I test the influence of local methods of judicial governance on the accumulation of legal knowledge through case studies of five jurisdictions across Italian regions: Milan, Venice, Rome, Palermo and Reggio Calabria. I show that the accumulation of legal expertise on left-wing terrorism in the 1970s later translated into the effective prosecution of mafia organizations in the 1980s. Finally, I show that anti-corruption networks drew from legal expertise on these criminal issues to promote the effective prosecution of a long-standing system of political corruption in the 1990s, with the so called "Clean Hands investigation."
Articles:
Working Papers:
Under Review:
My dissertation examines the conditions for the effective judicial prosecution of complex criminal phenomena, particularly systemic political corruption. As the recent examples of corruption investigations at the highest level of political power in Brazil, France, South Korea, Pakistan, and Israel show, the effective prosecution of this crime holds relevance not only for developing countries with relatively weak institutions, but also for well-established democracies. I show that judicial actors can increase their knowledge of complex criminal issues through their relationship with groups of social activists mobilized against pervasive illegality. Thus, my dissertation focuses on the accumulation and diffusion of knowledge through networks of judicial actors and social activists. I also show that different institutional frameworks affect the likelihood of network formation. To this end, I offer an original classification of judiciary branches’ internal organizations as either flat or elitist to different degrees. I show that flat judicial institutions more easily allow their members to create informal networks with their peers and with societal actors. Moreover, within flat institutions, those jurisdictions where case assignment follows meritocratic or egalitarian criteria will encourage younger judges’ specialization in the effective prosecution of crime. As a result, these jurisdictions will witness the accumulation of legal expertise over time on specific criminal issues.
I use qualitative analytic techniques such as process tracing and case studies to assess my theory. My analysis focuses on the Italian judiciary over the years from re-democratization, in 1945, until 1996. I test the influence of local methods of judicial governance on the accumulation of legal knowledge through case studies of five jurisdictions across Italian regions: Milan, Venice, Rome, Palermo and Reggio Calabria. I show that the accumulation of legal expertise on left-wing terrorism in the 1970s later translated into the effective prosecution of mafia organizations in the 1980s. Finally, I show that anti-corruption networks drew from legal expertise on these criminal issues to promote the effective prosecution of a long-standing system of political corruption in the 1990s, with the so called "Clean Hands investigation."
Articles:
- "Friends You Can Trust: A Signaling Theory of Interest Group Litigation Before the U.S. Supreme Court" Lucia Manzi and Matthew E. K. Hall, Law & Society Review 51, no. 3 (September 1, 2017)
Working Papers:
Under Review:
- Open Eyes and Clean Hands: The Judiciary, Civil Society and the Effective Prosecution of Systemic Corruption in Italy
- New Conviction: Italian Judicial Networks, Mafias, and Corruption Trials
- Beyond Competition: Party System Institutionalization and Judicial Independence